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INTRODUCTION
"Agree, for the law is costly. "
William Camden (1551-1623)
In June of 1992, one of California's Courts of Appeal decided
another case which inadvertently illustrated the depths of irration-
ality to which summary judgment law in California has fallen. In
Do It Urself Moving & Storage v. Brown,' the court, having con-
cluded that the lower court properly excluded indispensable evi-
dence as a penalty for discovery abuse, and that, consequently, the
party would likely be nonsuited at opening statement, nevertheless
reversed a grant of summary judgment-forcing the case to a con-
cededly pointless trial.2 As one commentator has noted, results
similar to those reached in Do It Urself are not uncommon in
California:
Defendants' summary judgment motions regularly are
denied, often to the astonishment of counsel, even in the
face of explicit admissions that the plaintiff has no evidence
of an allegation critical to its claim . . . Similarly, the
plaintiffs' motions frequently are denied for failure to dis-
prove an affirmative defense in support of which absolutely
no evidence has been offered.
1. 7 Cal. App. 4th 27, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396 (1992).
2. Id. at 38, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 402. Being relegated to trial in California is not a pleasant fate,
and it is not cheap. Delays in many counties often force cases to ponder their lot for close to the full
five year statutory limit before being assigned out to trial. Cf. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.310
(West Supp. 1993). In the meantime, costs escalate. Or else the parties settle, often more to avoid
the expensive wait than as a true reflection of the merits. See generally Stuart R. Pollak, Liberalizing
Summary Adjudication: A Proposal, 36 HASTINGS LJ. 419, 426 passim (1985). In fiscal year 1990-
91, over a million new cases were filed in California's superior courts, 1,090 per judicial position.
2 JuDICmAL COuNCIL OF CALFORNiA, ANNuAL REPORT 39 (1992). With 865 cases per judicial
position disposed of in that time there is an enormous backlog of cases waiting for trial. Id. at 41.
While both cases filed and cases disposed of have increased since the 1981-82 fiscal year, recently
the first number has grown more rapidly and thus the net number of cases waiting for disposition has
been growing since the 1988-89 fiscal year. Id. at 43 Fig. 3; id. at 57 Fig. 9.
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In many situations, the opposing party has had ample
opportunity to obtain favorable evidence, and it may be
painfully obvious that this party will fail at trial. None-
theless... the motion must be denied ....
Do it Urselfthus mandates a patently futile trial. Contrast this with
the long-accepted rationale for the procedure: "The obvious pur-
pose to be served by the summary judgment procedure is to expe-
dite litigation by avoiding needless trials."4
The Do It Urself court relied on the general rule in California
that it is insufficient for the defendant at summary judgment to
note the established, proven, or stipulated lack of evidence on the
part of a plaintiff, even where that lack of evidence will plainly
lose the case for the plaintiff at trial.5 To win, the defendant must
come forth with affirmative evidence disproving the plaintiff's
case.6 The rule is the same where the plaintiff seeks to summarily
adjudicate a defense as to which the defendant has the burden at
trial. And all this in the face of the rule's plain purpose: to
"penetrate through evasive language and adept pleading and ascer-
tain the existence or absence of triable issues."' 7 Do It Urself cited
just two sources for the general rule: a single case and the irre-
futable R. Weil & I. Brown, California Practice Guide, Civil
3. Pollak, supra note 2, at 426.
4. Cone v. Union Oil Co., 129 Cal. App. 2d 558, 562, 277 P.2d 464,467 (1954). Much the
same thought was expressed by Justice Cardozo: "The very object of the motion for summary
judgment is to separate what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and
substantial, so that only the latter may subject a suitor to the burden of trial." Richard v. Credit
Suisse, 152 N.E. 110, 111 (N.Y. 1926).
5. Do It Urself, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 37-38, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 401-02. See generally Biljac
Assoc. v. First Interstate Bank, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1410, 1421, 267 Cal. Rptr. 819, 824-25 (1990).
6. Do It Urself, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 38, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 402.
7. Chem v. Bank of America, 15 Cal. 3d 866, 873,544 P.2d 1310, 1314, 127 Cal. Rptr. 110,
114 (1976).
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Procedure Before Trial,8 which itself cites another recent case,
Chevron USA Inc. v. Superior Court.9
How could California have developed such a plainly foolish
rule? As I have noted elsewhere, the language of the current stat-
ute, Code of Civil Procedure 437c, plainly does not require this
odd burden of proof.'" Regardless, courts constantly invoke this
higher standard,11 some local rules actually mandate it12 (as if
judges could fashion laws), judges and lawyers castigate it,3 but
nothing explains the rule's rationale.
The federal system expressly discarded a rule similar to
California's some years ago. 14 In federal court, of course, the
party with the burden at trial has the burden at the summary judg-
ment motion stage. 15 Federal courts impose this burden because
they recognize the inherent pointlessness of letting a case clog up
8. R. WEiL & I. BROWN, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GuIDE, CWM PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL
§ 10:243, at 10-59 (1992).
9. 4 Cal. App. 4th 544, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 674 (1992). The Chevron opinion cites two key
sources: (i) the Barnes case, which is discussed below, and, in a classic example of the mutual
admiration a society comprised of commentators and judges displays, (ii) the very same paragraph
of the Weil and Brown text which cites the Chevron opinion, i.e., § 10:243. ld at 553, 5 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 679.
10. Curtis Karnow, Follow the Federal Lead on Summary Judgment, 12 CAL. LAW. 67 (1989),
reprinted in DAVID LEvImE Er AL, CALiFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDuRE 237-38 (1991). The Chevron case
(among other cases) baldly states that the rule is required by the statute. This assertion is taken up
below in Section III of this Article. Since Chevron was decided, the Legislature has amended § 437c.
The amendment is of uncertain effect: addresses, but does not resolve, the burden of proof issue
discussed here. The burden remains on the defendant to show that an essential element of the
plaintiff's claim cannot be established. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c (n)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
Following that showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a "triable issue" still exists.
Id. The effect of this language remains wholly unclear. For a discussion of the new amendment and
other legislative attempts to modify the rule, see infra notes 194-197 and accompanying text.
11. Courts construe the papers of moving parties strictly, construe those of opposing parties
liberally, and use the epithet "disfavored motion" to refer to the procedure. See, e.g., Loving v.
Tenneco West, Inc., 14 Cal. App. 4th 1272, 1276, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 505 (1993).
12. See, e.g., ALAMEDA SUP. Cr. R. 10.10(2)-(4); MARN SuP. CT. R. 2.13(b)-(d), (q).
13. William J. Dowling, Is There Any Hope for the Celotex Rule on Summary Judgment
Motions in California?, 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 493,493 n.4, 494 n.8 (1992); WEIL & BROWN, supra note
8, at § 10:277; Kamow, supra note 10, at 67.
14. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
15. 1d at 322.
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the system when one party or the other demonstrably cannot suc-
ceed at trial.1
6
In a fit of exasperation, I had another look at Barnes v. Blue
Haven Pools,17 one of the classic cases on the subject, which was
cited by both the Do It Urself and Chevron courts. This inquiry
prompted me to read a series of other cases, a crazy-quilt of empty,
cross-referenced citations by appellate courts, an important but
unnoticed change in a California statute, and a cardinal error in the
citation of pre-World War II cases. As it turns out, California's
current rule on the burden of proof stems from an elementary mis-
take: courts continued to cite cases decided under a statute super-
seded in 1939, confused two types of burdens of proof, and in so
doing, inadvertently made new, and probably wrong, law. This
Article traces the error and tries to explain it.
The Article tells the story of how law is made. It does not trace
the earthshaking developments on abortion, the First Amendment,
or an issue that one would find in the newspapers, but rather the
development of what might be called interstitial law." The issue
of burden of proof on summary judgment is not the stuff of which
prime time telecasts are made, but it makes a profound difference
to litigants and to the cost of the judicial system. The doctrine pro-
liferated out of the limelight, having gone unexamined and, because
of that, is more pernicious.
16. See, e.g., id. at 327; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,587
(1986). See generally The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 250-258 (1986).
17. 1 Cal. App. 3d 123, 81 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1969).
18. That is to say, the slow accretion of procedural rules, almost invisible in the interstices
of the development of substantive law.
1850
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I. THE LABYRINTH OF CITATIONS
"The law is a bottomless pit. "
John Arbuthnot c. 171219
It is a generally accepted conceit that the reason of law can be
found if one will only trace antecedents back through the mists of
time.20 That archival venture is undertaken below, in part because
that is all that contemporary cases such as Do It Urself accomplish
to justify the burden of proof. Citation to citation, the authority for
current law is traced back across half a century of California appel-
late decisions. But as Justice Holmes might have warned, such a
journey cannot ultimately explain the law.2' Despite a wide range
of factual backgrounds in the cases, facts pertinent to the issue of
burden are never alluded to in the citing cases. Instead, groups of
cases are mentioned by rote, the general rule is briefly announced,
and the decision is declared. Most cases just cite more cases and
never imply a rationale for the rule on burden of proof. Those that
do allude to a reason simply cite the governing statute. But the stat-
ute has no answers.
Tracing these cases back does, however, provide one central
insight. The exercise reveals a sudden, unexplained break from
cases discussing the burden on defendants' motions for summary
judgment to references to motions brought by plaintiffs.
Appellate authors often use string cites, as if there was safety
in numbers. This Section of the Article follows the multi-stringed
path as far as it can, and an indulgent reader must be assumed.
Roughly two series of cases trace back to a very few cases decided
in the late 1940s and early 1950s, when California lawyers started
19. This quote is also attributed to Jonathan Swift.
20. "The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of history." Oliver
W. Holmes, The Path of The Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
21. Mocking the usual methods, Justice Holmes observes: "We follow [legal tradition] into
the Year Books, and perhaps beyond them to the customs of the Salian Franks, and somewhere in
the past, in the German forests, in the needs of the Norman kings.... [But] it is revolting to have
no better reason for a rule of law than so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV" Id. at 469.
1851
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to exploit summary judgment. Each of these two lines of authority
radiates back in time from the 1969 Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools
decision.'
Barnes, indeed, sets out the rule dutifully applied by Do It
Urself. even where it is manifest that a nonsuit will be ordered at
trial, summary judgment cannot be ordered simply on the basis that
a party with a burden of proof plainly has no evidence at all.23
Barnes cites three cases as authority for the rule: Canifax v.
Hercules Powder Co.,24 Kramer v. Barnes,'5 and McClary v.
Concord Avenue Motors.26 Below, this Article will separately
trace the first two cases. These lines converge around 1958 when
Southern Pacific Co. v. Fish27 was decided. The Article then fol-
lows the roots of case development back to the cardinal 1931 case
of Gardenswartz v. Equitable Life Assurance Society.28
But first, Barnes' use of the McClary case should be noted.
While McClary addressed the sufficiency of the evidentiary record
as a whole, the opinion did not address the issue of which party
bears the burden to establish a "triable" issue. A triable issue of
fact was conceded by the parties before the appellate court, and the
case itself cites no precedent on the matter of burden at the motion
phase.29 Thus, McClary never should have been cited by Barnes;
it decides nothing.
A. The Canifax-de Echeguren-Family Services Circuit
The classic case Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools relies on
Canifax.3° Barnes relies on de Echeguren v. de Echeguren3' to
22. Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools, 1 Cal. App. 3d 123,81 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1969). Barnes, it will
be recalled, is the central case authority for contemporaneous pronouncements of California's rule
in Do it Urseif and Chevron. Id.; see supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the
relationship of the Barnes decision to the California rule).
23. Barnes, I Cal. App. 3d at 127-28, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
24. 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).
25. 212 Cal. App. 2d 440, 27 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1963).
26. 202 Cal. App. 2d 564, 21 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1962).
27. 166 Cal. App. 2d 353, 333 P.2d 133 (1958).
28. 23 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 745 (1937).
29. McClary, 202 Cal. App. 2d at 565, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
30. Barnes, I Cal. App. 3d at 127-28, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
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the effect that the defending party (i.e. the plaintiff, where the
defendant seeks judgment) has no obligation to produce any evi-
dence at all until the moving party proves every element necessary
to sustain a judgment in defendant's favor.32 This is a classic
statement of the California rule.
De Echeguren itself relied in turn on three cases: House v.
Lala,33 Southern Pacific, and Gardenswartz.M On the specific
issue of burden, de Echeguren cites two cases: Southern Pacific
and Taliaferro v. Taliaferro3 1
We will return to Southern Pacific below. Here, we briefly
follow the Taliaferro cite. Without explanation, Taliaferro specifies
two cases-the now-familiar Southern Pacific opinion and
Wuelzer v. City of Oakland.36 On the specific issue of the burden
on summary judgment, Wuelzer just cites two other cases:
Gardenwartz again (to which we will also return) and Family
Services v. Ames.
37
'With Family Services, we come to an important moment in
these tangled references. Family Services involved an appeal by a
defendant, not a plaintiff, from summary judgment.38 In this con-
31. 210 Cal. App. 2d 141, 26 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1962).
32. Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44,50,46 Cal. Rptr. 552,555 (1965).
33. 180 Cal. App. 2d 412, 4 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1960).
34. 23 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 745, 68 P.2d 322 (1937).
35. The court explained:
As stated in Southern Pac. Co. v. Fish, supra, 'There first must be a sufficiently supportive
affidavit before the defects of any counter affidavit, either of form or substance, need be
examined.... (166 Cal. App. 2d at p. 366, emphasis added.) mhe failure of a party to file a
counter affidavit does not of itself entitle the moving party to summary judgment. [Citations.]'
(Taliaferro v. Taliaferro (1960) 179 Cal. App. 2d 787, 791 [4 Cal. Rptr. 689, 691].)
de Echeguren, 210 Cal. App. 2d at 147, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
36. 170 Cal. App. 2d 337, 338 P.2d 912 (1959).
37. 166 Cal. App. 2d 344, 333 P.2d 142 (1958). Wuelzer also mentions Eagle Oil & Ref. Co.
v. Prentice, 19 Cal. 2d 553, 122 P.2d 264 (1942), for the general proposition that facts are not to be
determined by summary judgment motion; the court is only meant to discern whether there is a
factual dispute sufficient for a jury's evaluation. Wuelzer, 170 Cal. App. 2d at 339, 338 P.2d at 913.
This, in turn, requires that the moving affidavits be construed strictly and opposing affidavits be
construed "liberally." Id. at 339, 338 P.2d at 913. This accurate rendition of Eagle Oil is quite
separate from Wuelzer's holding that the defending party may avoid summary judgment without
presenting any evidence at all. IL at 340-41, 338 P.2d at 914. The confusion between Eagle Oil's
holding and that of Wuelzer is treated at length below. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
38. Family Services, 166 Cal. App. 2d at 346, 333 P.2d at 143.
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text the court held that the plaintiff had to prove at the summary
judgment stage every element of plaintiff's case.39 That is, the
requirement of this case is that the plaintiff-who after all has the
burden of proof at trial-has exactly the same burden of estab-
fishing his case at summary judgment, before any requirement
could be imposed on the defendant to respond. It is not remarkable
to rule that a party must, in any context, prove the elements of the
party's own claim. But plainly such a ruling does not support the
proposition that defendants must disprove plaintiffs' case.
Family Services relied on a few cases: Coyne v. Krempels,40
Gardenswartz, and Southern Pacific. Coyne also involved an appeal
by a defendant of summary judgment entered in the plaintiff's
favor.41 Justice Traynor affirmed the judgment because the plain-
tiff had in fact established his case, and the defendant had not
rebutted it.42 As we will see below, Gardenswartz, the other case
relied on in Family Services, was importantly similar to Coyne. In
both Gardenswartz and Coyne, the moving party that had the
requirement of first establishing its case was, in fact, the plaintiff.
And in both cases, of course, it was the plaintiff who had the bur-
den at trial.
As we will see, Gardenswartz is the early case back to which
many of these citation strings resolve. But before we focus on the
ruling of the oft-cited Gardenswartz, there is another line of author-
ity emanating back from the Barnes decision that requires tracing
back through the miasma of time.
B. The Kramer-House-Southern Pacific Circuit
The attentive and caring reader will recall that Barnes, relied on
by the Do It Urself and Chevron opinions, cited three cases, one of
39. Id at 351-52, 333 P.2d at 146.
40. 36 Cal. 2d 257, 223 P.2d 244 (1950).
41. Id at 258, 223 P.2d at 245.
42. The plaintiff filed affidavits showing entitlement to judgment and the defendant did
nothing but point to the existence of a verified answer. Id at 262-63, 223 P.2d at 247-48. The court
held that a mere pleading, such as an answer, does not controvert evidence such as presented by the
plaintiff in sworn affidavits. Id
1854
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which was Kramer v. Barnes.43 Kramer repeats the current rule:
Moving parties must provide "sufficiently supportive affidavits"
before the court will examine any defects of counter-affidavits. 44
The Kramer court relies on three cases: Southern Pacific v. Fish,45
Snider v. Snider,46 and House v. Lala.47 Snider itself is of no
independent authority. It simply and directly relies on House and
quotes from the text of the then-current Civil Code Section 437c
governing summary judgment: The affidavits of the moving party
"must contain facts sufficient to entitle.., defendant to a judgment
in the action .... What is "sufficient" is, of course, the issue.
In turn, House places central reliance on Southern Pacific, also
invoking Gardenswartz.49 Southern Pacific is relied on for the
proposition that the "absence of counter-affidavits does not relieve
the moving party of the burden of establishing the evidentiary facts
of every element necessary to entitle the moving party to
judgment."5 °
C. From Southern Pacific to Gardenswartz
Plainly, it is time to look at Southern Pacific. This case is
relied on, directly or indirectly, by virtually every one of the cases
cited so far.5' Southern Pacific reversed a summary judgment on
the basis that the affidavits below did not contain admissible evi-
dence. 2 Contrary to the current rule,53 the Southern Pacific
43. 212 Cal. App. 2d 440, 27 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1963).
44. Id. at 445, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
45. 166 Cal. App. 2d 353, 333 P.2d 133 (1958).
46. 200 Cal. App. 2d 741, 19 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1962).
47. 180 Cal. App. 2d 412, 4 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1960).
48. Snider v. Snider, 200 Cal. App. 2d 741, 748, 19 Cal. Rptr. 709, 714 (1962).
49. House, 180 Cal. App. 2d at 416, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
50. Id. at 416, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 368 (citing Southern Pac. Co. v. Fish, 166 Cal. App. 2d 353,
366, 333 P.2d 133, 141 (1958)).
51. See, e.g., id. at 416, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 368; Kramer v. Barnes, 212 Cal. App. 2d 440, 445,
27 Cal. Rptr. 895, 898 (1963); Snider, 200 Cal. App. 2d at 748, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 714; Taliaferro v.
Taliaferro, 179 Cal. App. 2d 787,791, 4 Cal. Rptr. 689, 692 (1960); de Echeguren v. de Echeguren,
210 Cal. App. 2d 141, 147, 26 Cal. Rptr. 562, 565 (1962).
52. Southern Pacific, 166 Cal. App. 2d at 366, 333 P.2d at 141.
53. See CAI. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(b), (d) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that evidentiary
objections not made at a hearing are waived).
1855
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opinion held that a party (here, the plaintiff) could not waive objec-
tions to incompetent evidence, i.e. that such failures are eternally
reviewable on appeal. More centrally, though, Southern Pacific
stated the familiar rule: The moving affidavits (here filed by the
defendants) must state facts covering every element necessary to
sustain a judgment. 4 One case was relied on for this: Kimber v.
Jones.55
But Kimber, like Family Services, involved a plaintiff moving
for summary judgment.5 6 The court imposed on the plaintiff the
burden to prove every element of his case before judgment, sum-
mary or otherwise, could be entered in his favor." T wo cases
were alluded to in Kimber: Coyne58 and Hardy v. Hardy.59 We
have seen Coyne before, and, like both Kimber and Family
Services, Coyne involved a plaintiff moving for judgment.'
However, the Hardy case, in which a defendant successfully
moved for summary judgment, may be different from Kimber,
Family Services, and Coyne. In Hardy, Justice Traynor affirmed the
grant of summary judgment, holding that the defendant had indeed
provided affidavits, and that the plaintiff had been unable to rebut
them.6' Thus, the sufficiency of the moving party's evidence was
not at issue. Instead, the California Supreme Court examined the
opposing party's evidence-the plaintiff's-and found that the
plaintiff could not prove his own case. 2 Without explanation and
in what is technically dicta, the opinion may suggest through its
use of the word "party" instead of "plaintiff" that moving parties
in general-plaintiffs or defendants-are obligated to shoulder
some burden of proof, presenting at least some facts, regardless of
what an opposing party can or cannot muster by way of evi-
54. Southern Pacific, 166 Cal. App. 2d at 364, 333 P.2d at 140.
55. Kimber v. Jones, 122 Cal. App. 2d 914, 265 P.2d 922 (1954).
56. Id at 915, 265 P.2d at 923. "
57. Id at 918, 919, 265 P.2d at 925.
58. Coyne v. Krempels, 36 Cal. 2d 257, 223 P.2d 244 (1950).
59. 23 Cal. 2d 244, 143 P.2d 701 (1943).
60. Coyne, 36 Cal. 2d at 258, 223 P.2d at 245.
61. Hardy, 23 Cal. 2d at 247-48, 143 P.2d at 703.
62. Id at 247, 143 P.2d at 703.
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dence.63 This brief dicta could, therefore, be read as imposing on
defendants the burden of disproving plaintiffs' cases. Justice
Traynor refers only to the statute, Code of Civil Procedure
section 437c.r4 Thus, other than the statutory citation taken up in
Section IHi below, the Hardy line is a dead end.
Southern Pacific then must take us to its antecedent,
Gardenswartz. As we saw previously, numerous cases invoked the
1937 Gardenswartz case as well as, i.e., de Echeguren, Coyne,
House, Wuelzer, and Family Services.
Gardenswartz was actually decided by the appellate department
of the Los Angeles Superior Court, reviewing a judgment from the
municipal court. A small acorn as these things go. As the suspi-
cious reader will have surmised, this case, like Coyne, Kimber, and
others, involved the sufficiency of the plaintiffs showing in support
of his motion for summary judgment.65 The controlling statute at
the time required affidavits containing "facts sufficient to entitle
plaintiff to a judgment in the action, and the facts stated therein
shall be within the personal knowledge of the affiant, and shall be
set forth with particularity ...." Under this rule, Superior Court
Judge Shaw said that the court could not grant summary judgment
for the plaintiff even if the defendants failed to file any evidence
at all, and if the plaintiff's affidavits contained inadmissible
testimony.67
In Gardenswartz, the plaintiff had sued his insurance company
on three disability policies.68 The insurance company denied that
he was disabled, but the municipal court entered judgment for the
policyholder.69 Judge Shaw, on appeal, found fatal flaws in evi-
63. Id. at 245, 143 P.2d at 702.
64. 1939 Cal. Stat. ch. 331, sec. 1, at 1671-72, quoted in Hardy, 23 Cal. 2d at 247, 143 P.2d
at 702.
65. Gardenswartz v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 23 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 745 (1937).
66. 1933 Cal. Stat. ch. 744, sec. 27, at 1849 (emphasis added).
67. The plaintiff's papers were, in fact, held insufficient, because they were not directly
relevant. Judge Shaw thought they were impermissibly directed to the "ultimate fact in issue," thus
beyond the expertise of the proffered expert, and were too general. Gardenswartz, 23 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. at 753.
68. Id. at 753.
69. Id. at 754.
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dence presented by both the defendant and the plaintiff. Thus,
because it was the plaintiff's burden to prove his case, the plain-
tiff's lack of evidence resulted in a reversal of the judgment. Judge
Shaw pointedly did not find for the plaintiff, despite the fact that
the defendants failed to file an adequate opposition to the summary
judgment motion.70
The Gardenswartz court cited only one other pertinent
California case, also authored by Judge Shaw and again reviewing
a judgment in the local municipal court. In Cowan Oil and Refining
Co. v. Miley Petroleum Corp., the court was also charged with
reviewing the adequacy of affidavits filed in connection with the
defendant's motion for summary judgment.72 Since the Cowan
decision devotes most of its time to a discussion of constitutional
issues outside the scope of this Article, the case is of little use to
this analysis. 3
IX. THE STATUTORY BACKGROUND
"Laws are like sausages. It's better not to see them being
made."
Otto von Bismarck
The review of cases back to the early 1930s leads to the same
place. Regardless of the route taken, in the end the reader is
referred to the wording of the summary judgment statute. This
Section reviews the development of the statute and addresses the
proposition that California's summary judgment legislation imposes
a burden of proof.74
70. I at 754.
71. 112 Cal. App. Supp. 773 (1931).
72. Id. at 779-81.
73. Cowan unnecessarily spends much of its time endorsing the constitutionality of the
procedure against the challenge that it deprives parties to their right to trial. Id. at 776. Almost 30
years earlier, the United States Supreme Court had approved the constitutionality of the technique.
See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 317 (1902).
74. See supra notes 10, infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of
recent California legislation).
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A. A Plaintiff's Statute
Nothing in Cowan or Gardenswartz supports the proposition
that defendants must shoulder the burden of disproving plaintiffs'
cases, or the converse, namely, that plaintiffs need to shoulder the
burden of disproving affirmative defenses. That particular issue was
not considered by Judge Shaw in either of his opinions, because,
before 1939, Code of Civil Procedure section 437c did not contem-
plate motions by defendants. 5 Under prior law, only plaintiffs
were authorized to file the motions. In 1939, for the first time, the
statute was revised to provide that "if it claimed that there is no
defense to the action or that the action has no merit, on motion of
either party [summary judgment may be ordered]. 76
A more informal proceeding had actually been authorized in
California municipal courts in 1925, under then Code of Civil
Procedure section 83 1f.77 As then enacted, the statute allowed the
75. 1937 Cal. Stat. ch. 533, sec. I, at 1545-46. See Comment, The Work of the 1939
California Legislature, 13 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1939).
76. 1939 Cal. Stat. ch. 331, sec. 1, at 1671 (emphasis added).
77. The statute reads in pertinent part:
(3) At any time after issue of fact is joined, the court upon its own motion may, and upon
written demand of any party shall, cite all parties to appear before the court at a time and
place certain for summary proceedings.
Such citation may be served upon the party personally or upon his attorney of
record. It must be served not less than five days before the return day.
Each party must appear personally, or by person or persons having knowledge of the
facts and authorized in writing by such party to so appear, and with or without counsel
as he may desire. If a party is an assignee of a cause of action, counterclaim or cross-
complaint, in addition to any other person he shall procure the presence of the first
assignor thereof or its agent making the assignment, if he be available. For any person
whose presence is herein required, subpoena shall be issued by the clerk at the request of
any party. If clear proof be made that no person having knowledge of the facts
constituting the cause of action, defense, counterclaim or cross-complaint is available, the
party may by his counsel, make the statement herein provided, in which case any other
party at his option may make his statement by counsel only.
At such time, or other time or times to which the proceeding may be continued, the
judge shall require the parties, or the person or persons appearing respectively on their
behalf, to state under oath the facts upon which the respective claims and defenses of the
parties are based. If a party is authorized by the provisions hereof to appear by counsel
only, his counsel shall state the facts upon which his claim or defense is based. The court
shall regulate the order of making the statements as justice requires.
Such statements, together with all that occurs at such examination, shall be taken
down by a court reporter, and the notes of the court reporter, or transcript of such notes,
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court, or either party, to move for summary judgment." Upon
such motion, the parties were required to attend court and state the
facts supporting their respective claims. After hearing from both
parties, the court would make its determination:
If from such statements it shall appear, without substantial
conflict as to facts, that any party is entitled to judgment
against any other party, the court shall cause such judgment
to be entered forthwith.79
This statute is silent regarding the allocation of the burden of proof
on either party. The procedure was formalized in 1929 as Code of
Civil Procedure section 831d."° Going back to tradition, this sec-
tion expressly limited itself to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs could secure
judgment if they presented admissible evidence showing their
entitlement. Defendants could avoid summary judgment only if
they met the plaintiff's material with contrary sworn facts.8'
When this formalized procedure was first introduced in
California in 1929 only certain motions in municipal court were
certified by the court reporter and the court and filed in the office of the clerk.
If from such statements shall appear, without substantial conflict as to facts, that any
party is entitled to judgment against any other party, the court shall cause such judgment
to be entered forthwith.
1925 Cal. Stat. ch. 436, sec. 1, at 946.
78. ld
79. id.
80. 1929 Cal. Stat. ch. 727, sec. 1, at 1343-45.
81. This statute, in pertinent part, stated:
[I1f it is claimed that there is no defense to the action, on motion of the plaintiff,
supported by a verified complaint, or if not verified then by the affidavit of the plaintiff
or of any other person having knowledge of the facts, the answer may be stricken out and
judgment may be entered, in the discretion of the court, unless the defendant by affidavit
shall show such facts as may be deemed by the judge hearing the motion sufficient to
entitle him to defend.
Such affidavit shall be made by the defendant, or by any other person, having knowledge
of the facts, and shall set forth facts showing that the defendant has a good and substantial
defense to the plaintiff's action.., upon the merits .... The facts so stated shall be the
personal knowledge of the affiant, [and] shall be set forth in the affidavit with particularity
Id.
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allowed. 2 Superior courts were authorized to use the procedure
in 1933.83
The statute was renamed section 437c in 1933. 4 Later, in an
article written to encourage the procedure's use, an author noted
that summary judgment "has been a part of the English Law for
decades, [but] its introduction into American jurisprudence has
been comparatively recent." 85 The article contains a fine survey
of the use of the procedure in California and across the United
States, and, in each case discussed, plaintiffs are the presumed
moving party.86 This presumption followed from the then-current
perception that plaintiffs' cases were generally meritorious, and that
defendants often sought delay and abused the process of litigation
so as to postpone the day of judgment.
B. Requirements of the Statute
When section 437c was amended in 1939 to allow defendants
to move for summary judgment,8 there were no other material
82. Comment, supra note 75, at 7.
83. Id.
84. 1933 Cal. Stat. ch. 744, sec. 27, at 1848-49.
85. Hilton H. McCabe, Summary Judgment, 11 S. CAL L. REV. 436, 436 (1938).
86. McCabe did not refer to the four year period between 1925 and 1929 when both
defendants and plaintiffs had an equivalent summary procedure available. Id. at 436. Most states
(except Wisconsin) which allowed summary judgment in 1937 only allowed plaintiffs to make the
motion. See, e.g., Fuller v. General Accident Fie & Life Assurance Corp., 272 N.W. 839, 843
(1937). See Comment supra note 75, at 8. Another important survey of the period evaluated the law
in various places in the British Empire, Canada, and 17 jurisdictions in the United States. In each,
only the plaintiff was authorized to move for summary judgment. Charles E. Clark & Charles U.
Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YAM LJ. 423 passim (1929).
87. Clark & Samenow, supra note 86, at 469-70 & n.324.
88. Perhaps, by this time, the Legislature had recognized that the cost of litigation had itself
become a weapon in the armory of litigants, and that plaintiffs too could play off those costs to exact
unreasonable settlements. In what may be the first suggestion of a defense summary judgment
motion, an obscure footnote in a study undertaken on behalf of the Connecticut courts urges the
courts to permit defendants to raise "issues of law, arising from the affidavit .... Id. at 471 n.326.
The authors obliquely suggest that such a motion had been presaged by the Anglo-Saxon practice of
"essoins." Id. at 469 n.323. This seems unlikely. Medieval courts accepted an essoin as a defendant's
excuse not to appear and respond to a summons, but the effect was temporary: war, illness, absence
beyond the seas, and "tempest" only postponed a defendant's obligation to respond. None of the
excuses went to the merits of the dispute as do motions for summary judgment, or motions to strike
pleadings as "sham." See infra notes 167-176 and accompanying text (discussing motions to strike
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changes. This, in part, may have made it simple for courts to
impose the same burden on moving plaintiffs and moving defen-
dants: now both sides had to provide "sufficient" affidavits in order
to win.
1. Equal Burdens: Treating Defendants Like Plaintiffs
It may be the statute's failure to distinguish plaintiffs from
defendants that explains why so many cases have assumed that
California's rule on the burden of proof was mandated by the stat-
ute. Case after case has simply relied on the statute's wording to
make the point that Justice Traynor made in Hardy: The statute is
an adequate citation for the proposition at issue.89 The Chevron
case reasons that the "moving defendant is statutorily treated as a
'plaintiff' and hence must present sufficient facts to make out a
prima facie case of non-liability."90 And in 1937, Gardenswartz
itself relied expressly on the language of the statute to impose the
burden of proof on the plaintiff moving for summary judgment.9'
'The key 1958 case of Southern Pacific writes that "of course" the
statute makes no distinction between moving plaintiffs and the
defendants, and then it imposes the same burden of proof on any
moving party, as if the statute required the result.92 The fact that
the statute does not expressly distinguish between moving plaintiffs
and moving defendants is taken up by the state courts through the
ensuing decades to justify their allocation of the burden of
proof.9
3
pleadings as shams). See generally 2 W.S. HOLDswoRm, A HIsToRY OF ENLiSH LAW 103-04 (3d
ed. 1923); 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDRIC WILLIAM MAIThAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
560 (1895).
89. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (discussing Traynor's reasoning in Hardy).
90. Chevron v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. App. 4th 544, 552, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 674, 679 (1992)
(emphasis added).
91. Gardenswartz v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 23 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 745,754 (1937).
92. Southern Pacific v. Fish, 166 Cal. App. 2d 353, 366, 333 P.2d 133, 141 (1958).
93. See, e.g., Biljac Assoc. v. First Interstate Bank, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1410, 1421, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 819, 825 (1990). BiIjac relies on the venerable Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools, 1 Cal. App. 3d
123, 127, 81 Cal. Rptr. 444, 447 (1969).
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However, the question of whether the statute determines the
allocation of burden is not decided by the fact that the statute does
not distinguish between moving plaintiffs and defendants. Federal
law, has the same summary judgment procedures governed by a
statute which, too, does not distinguish between plaintiffs and
defendants.' Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court
decided Celotex v. Catrett95 in direct conflict with the California
construction, holding that plaintiffs opposing a summary judgment
motion filed by defendants must shoulder the burden of proving
their case, just as they would have to do at trial.96 There are other
rules, which do not on their face distinguish between plaintiffs and
defendants, but which tolerate different evidentiary burdens.97
In 1990, a California appellate decision, Biljac Associates v.
First Interstate Bank,98 expressly considered Celotex, but rejected
it on the basis of state precedent.99 In Biljac, bank customers had
sued a group of lending institutions, accusing them of conspiring
to raise and fix commercial lending rates, thereby eliminating com-
petition." The banks successfully moved for summary judgment
in the trial court, winning a ruling that was affirmed on appeal.01
Biljac began the pertinent discussion by noting that the Celotex
issue was never addressed by the parties, which is not surprising;
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
95. 477 U.S. 317 (1986). True, litigants might have thought before Celotex that the wording
of Rule 56 allocated the burden of proof on the moving party, regardless of whether the plaintiff or
defendant was making the motion. Certainly, the Court in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 159-160 (1970), clearly imposed on moving defendants the burden of negating every possible
basis for plaintiffs' suit. But without an intervening material change in Rule 56, Celotex
impliedly-but unquestionably-rejected the Adickes rule.
96. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
97. See, e.g., CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 630 (West Supp. 1993) (motion for directed verdict);
id, § 629 (West 1976) (motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict). More generally, any
procedural or substantive rule of law silent on evidentiary burdens contemplates burdens that differ
depending on the party. For example, statutes that define the bases for claims of contract breaches
and torts, defenses and privileges, generally omit any allusion to the burden of proof or of coming
forward with evidence. Yet their allocation of burdens is established by external rules, including
statutes and court decisions, which expressly distinguish between plaintiffs and defendants.
98. 218 Cal. App. 3d 1410, 267 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1990).
99. Id. at 1421-22, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
100. Id. at 1416, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
101. Id. at 1416-18, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23.
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both sides had provided substantial evidentiary material.'0 2 The
Biljac majority confined itself to the citation of old cases such as
Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools.13 The concurring opinion also
alluded to old cases, but went to suggest that California's rule is
statutorily required." The concurring opinion explained that
Code of Civil Procedure section 437c is materially different from
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 in that a moving party in
California (1) must contend "that the action has no merit or that
there is no defense,"'' 5 and (2) the action may be defeated by
adverse inferences reasonably deduced from the evidence.'0 6
In truth neither point distinguishes federal law, nor, therefore,
Celotex. Under federal law, just as under California law, the
moving party must establish entitlement to judgment, and under
federal law, just as under state law, all reasonable inferences must
be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion.0 7 Cases
before and since Biljac have also noted the opposing state and
federal standards, but have not questioned the rationale for the dis-
tinction.'0 8
102. Id. at 1421-22,267 Cal. Rptr. at 824-25. The court's discussion of the federal rule is dicta
which is pointless in view of the ruling sustaining summary judgment on the basis that defendants
indeed negated plaintiffs' case, and proved the lack of a conspiracy. There was no room, therefore,
for a meaningful application of Celotex, as there were no defects in the opposing affidavits on which
to rule.
103. 1 Cal. App. 3d 123, 81 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1969). Biljac also cited Pena v. W.H. Douthitt
Steel & Supply Co., 179 Cal. App. 3d 924, 929, 225 Cal. Rptr. 76,79 (1986); Lee v. Electric Motor
Div., 169 Cal. App. 3d 375,382,215 Cal. Rptr. 195, 197-98 (1985); and Security Pacific Nat'l Bank
v. Associated Motor Sales, 106 Cal. App. 3d 171, 179, 165 Cal. Rptr. 38, 43 (1980).
104. Biljac, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1435-45, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 834-41 (Kline, PJ., concurring).
105. Id. at 1441, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39 (Kline, P.J., concurring) (citing Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c(a)).
106. Id. at 1441, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (Kline, P.J., concurring).
107. 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcncE § 56.15 [1.-00], at 56-214 (1993); id., § 56.15[8], at 56-
344.
108. University of S. California v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1028, 272 Cal. Rptr. 264
(1990); AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1061, 225 Cal. Rptr. 203
(1986).
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2. The Burden of Producing an Affidavit
Thus, the impact of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c on
the analysis here devolves to its mandate that "affidavits" be filed
in support of summary judgment, regardless of who files the
motion.'09 The affidavit requirement has been in the statute ever
since the procedure was formalized in 1929 and through the 1939
amendment which made the technique available to defendants.
Today, the statute refers to other forms of evidence as well."'
The issue, thus, becomes whether that requirement imposes the
burden on the moving party the burden of negating the opposing
party's case, regardless of the burden at trial.
This, apparently, is not a trivial issue. Those who maintain that
the statute always imposes the burden on the moving party have
their position strongly supported by the very case which established
the contrary federal rule, Celotex. For there, Justice Rehnquist
seized upon the fact that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
expressly did not mandate the submission of affidavits by the
moving party."' The absence of a specific mandate in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 made it clear, said Justice Rehnquist,
that a moving party had no burden to disprove the opposing party's
case.12 The converse would seem to flow thus: California's stat-
ute does mandate moving affidavits; therefore the burden must be
on the moving party in the state courts.
However, there is no logical connection between the affidavit
requirement and burdens on parties. There is no rational link
109. See, e.g., 1951 Cal. Stat. ch. 1737, sec. 53, at 4101-02; 1939 Cal. Stat. ch. 331, sec. 1, at
1671; 1937 Cal. Stat. ch. 533, sec. I, at 1546; 1933 Cal. Stat. ch. 744, sec. 27, at 1849.
110. "The motion shall be supported by affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to
interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice shall or may be taken." CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 437c(b) (West 1993).
111. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, affidavits may be submitted at the option of
the moving or defending party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
112. Id. at 323-24. Justice Rehnquist exercised a little legerdemain here. Contrary to his
suggestion, the court below had not in fact ruled that a requirement of affidavits in FRCP 56
mandated the burden of proof. In truth, the court of appeal expressly held that affidavits were not
required. The court of appeal simply assumed the "showing" required by FRCP 56 implied the
introduction of some kind---any kind-of admissible evidence sufficient to negate the non-moving
party's case. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 185 n.12 (D.C. 1985).
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between requiring an affidavit-as opposed to other evidentiary
items such as depositions, interrogatory responses, admissions,
documents, or other papers-and a burden of proof, any more than
there is between the absence of an affidavit and the failure to sus-
tain a burden. It is simply beyond question that burdens can be sus-
tained or lost with or without affidavits. The issue on burdens of
proof is simply whether sufficient admissible evidence of any
nature is produced. Affidavits are not magic evidence. Indeed, as
sworn but not cross-examined and often self-serving testimony,
affidavits are less worthy than depositions or documents, such as
contracts, created before the suit was filed.'
The reference to affidavits was used in the old California stat-
utes as shorthand for "evidence," admissible evidence generically,
as opposed to the mere allegations of pleadings, which can be no
more than the fantasy of lawyers. The other sections of the statute
are, and have been, plainly designed to assure that the court will
act on admissible evidence before judgment is entered.'14 This
follows because it was- (and is) the point of the summary
judgment-as opposed to the more venerable demurrers and
motions to dismiss-to pierce the pleadings and evaluate the evi-
dence.1 5 It was the courts' authority to look behind the pleadings
that distinguished the summary judgment procedure. And behind
the pleadings, the law sees only evidence nothing else.
When California's summary judgment law was formalized in
1929, affidavits were one of the few (and generally the only)
113. Words uttered and things created before the instigation of suit are worth more than
affidavits in the sense that those earlier evidences (1) may not have been fabricated in contemplation
of suit and (2) were not made with the careful and private assistance of counsel. Deposition evidence
has the benefit of cross-examination by opposing counsel, and can come close to the quality and
reliability of evidence made at trial.
114. For example, the affiant had to have "knowledge of the facts" and display "personal
knowledge" (1929 and 1939 statutes). "Personal knowledge" is a requirement, and "affiant shall show
affirmatively that the affiant, if sworn as a witness, can testify competently thereto." 1939 Cal. Stat.
ch. 331, sec. 1, at 1671-72; 1929 Cal. Stat. ch. 727, sec. 1, at 1343-44. The statute today also
tolerates only admissible evidence. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 437c(d) (West Supp. 1993).
115. Weir v. Snow, 210 Cal. App. 2d 283, 289, 26 Cal. Rptr. 868, 871 (1962); Snider v.
Snider, 200 Cal. App. 2d 741, 747, 19 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713 (1962); Maltby v. Shook, 131 Cal. App.
2d 349, 355,280 P.2d 541,544 (1955); Cone v. Union Oil Co., 129 Cal. App. 2d 558,562,277 P.2d
464, 467 (1954).
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means of making pre-trial evidence available to the court,11 6 and
the production of any more substantial evidence was tantamount to
a trial.117 That is probably why the word "affidavit" was used in
the legislation. California's first discovery code was not enacted
until 1957.118 As late as 1961, the California Supreme Court was
referring to "the new system" of statutorily permitted dis-
covery.119 Before the code, parties could not propound interrog-
atories, requests for admissions, nor requests relating to the
genuineness of documents.1 20 Requests for production of docu-
ments were limited to those admissible at trial, not those (as under
modem practice) likely to lead to the discovery of relevant mater-
ial, and deposition practice was profoundly circumscribed.
12 1
Although California authorized summary judgment before the
federal courts, the jurisdictions had a similar discovery prac-
tice.122 In 1938, during the period when California first allowed
defendants to ask for summary judgment on the basis of affidavits,
federal courts granted bills of discovery permitting a party
to discover from its adversary evidence supporting the dis-
covering party's case, but nothing else. In actions at law, no
meaningful discovery was available apart from depositions
to obtain or preserve testimony from witnesses who would
not be available at trial. Discovery was considered anti-
116. This was generally considered to be true. "[Tihe affidavit is practically the sole guarantee
against perjury by the plaintiff," and, without it, plaintiffs were not entitled to summary judgment in
the early use of that procedure in the United States. Clark & Samenow, supra note 86, at 430.
117. See generally id. at 430-31.
118. The law was enacted as Code of Civil Procedure § 2016 et seq., effective January 1, 1958.
1957 Cal. Stat. ch. 1904, sec. 2, at 332124. See generally 2 BERNARD E. WrTKIN, CALIFORNIA
EVIDENCE § 1423, at 1402 (3d ed. 1986); David W. Louisell, Discovery Today, 45 CAL. L. REV. 486
(1957).
119. Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 376, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 99 (1961).
120. See 2 BERNARD E. WMIN, supra note 118, § 1425, at 1404.
121. See generally Edward M. Ford, Jr., Note, Procedure: Discovery: California and Federal
Civil Procedure: Physical Examination of Parties: Admission of Facts and Genuineness of
Documents, 42 CAL. L. REV. 187, 193 (1954); Donald L. Edgar, Comment, Discovery of Documents
and Things: The Federal Rules and the California Law, 42 CAL. L. REV. 829, 834 (1954).
122. Absent their own discovery statutes, federal courts generally relied on local state practice.
WILLIAM SCHWARZER & LYNN PASAHOW, CIVIL DIsCOVERY: A GUIDE TO EFFICIENT PRACTICE 3
(1988).
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thetical to the customary method of trial by secrecy and
surprise, and unnecessary for issue-narrowing, which was
accomplished through highly technical pleading
procedures."z
In 1925, California's summary judgment procedure ensured admis-
sible evidence by literally bringing the parties to court.124 Their
statements personally to the judge would provide the basis for
deciding whether a trial was needed to resolve credibility problems.
When out-of-court testimony was later allowed, requiring "affi-
davits" was the obvious way to ensure a similar admissibility.
Today, section 437c reads that the summary judgment "motion
shall be supported by affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers
to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice
shall or may be taken."' 5 But no one *makes the absurd sug-
gestion that this mandates the submission of each of those forms
of admissible evidence. Correspondingly, the 1929 and 1939
statutes' affidavit requirements suggest no more than the require-
ment that admissible evidence be provided. Had they been avail-
able, that requirement could have been met with written discovery
responses, depositions, admissions, and the like. The old affidavit
requirement says no more about burden than does the federal
statute's language. That federal language, too, contemplates some
form of evidentiary support, i.e. affidavits or other evidence,
12 6
but the evidentiary requirement does not imply a burden of
proof."7
Thus, while it is true that (i) the statute fails to distinguish
between plaintiffs and defendants, and (ii) moving "affidavits" are
123. Id. at 3. The authors describe the practice as of 1938, before the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were adopted.
124. 1925 Cal. Stat. ch. 436, sec. 1, at 946.
125. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(b) (West Supp. 1993).
126. "A party supports his motion for summary judgment by affidavits or other evidenfiary
matter sufficient to show that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact." FED. R. CIV. P. 56
(Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1963 Amendment, subdivision (e)).
127. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
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contemplated by at least the 1929 and 1939 versions, neither
fact about the statute determines the burden of proof. It follows that
the decisions in Chevron, Southern Pacific, and the like are wrong
when they suggest otherwise. The statute's wording does not sup-
port the holdings of those cases.
3. The Burden to Seek and Destroy: Targeting the
Non-Issue
What then does the statute's language mandate a moving party
to produce? The statute requires production equivalent to what
Celotex suggested is required by parties moving in federal
court.129 The burden remains on any moving party to identify the
pleadings and discovery which demonstrate the lack of a genuine
issue of material fact.130 The Supreme Court suggests that
[if] the burden of persuasion at trial would be on the non-
moving party, the party moving for summary judgment may
satisfy Rule 56's burden of production [by] . . . demon-
strat[ing] to the Court that the nonmoving party's evidence
is insufficient to establish an essential element of the non-
moving party's claim."'
This mandate to identify issues, and only this, is consistent with
the original and current aims of the statute to seek and segregate
128. See supra notes 114-123 and accompanying text (discussing the 1929 and 1939 versions
of section 437c).
129. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (discussing the Celotex requirements).
130. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
131. Id. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan dissented only from the result. In an
opinion joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, Brennan expressly agreed with the Court's
legal analysis. I&a at 329. With four subscribing Justices endorsing Justice Rehnquist's opinion, seven
Justices concurred on the reasoning of Celotex. Justice White's concurrence is obscure, although he
too probably endorsed the Court's view. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent. See The Supreme
Court-Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 250-51 n.8 (1986).
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triable issues."' To be sure, both federal and state statutes liter-
ally require an evidentiary showing, one which pointedly ignores
the pleadings. But "evidentiary" showings, as every defense lawyer
knows, may be demonstrations of emptiness: the absence of proof,
the failure of testimony, an unremembered fact.
By contrast, California custom shuts its eyes to that evidentiary
demonstration: Judges do not want to hear that the other party has
nothing to show the jury. Thus, judicial custom permits, parties to
.stand by their possibly vacuous pleadings---only the invention of
lawyers-with or without evidence. In so doing, California law
defeats the fundamental purpose of summary judgment: To pierce
and test the well-pleaded allegation'33 to discern if there is evi-
dence to present to a jury.
Hl1. THE MECHANICS OF ERROR
"Injustice is relatively easy to bear What stings is justice."
H.L. Mencken
In California, there is no case which expressly considers and
decides that the same burden of producing evidence applied to
plaintiffs shall be imposed on a defendant when the latter moves
for summary judgment. The doctrine however was firmly
entrenched by 1958 when Southern Pacific was decided. If the doc-
trine was not mandated by the statute, how could the courts have
so unquestioningly adopted it?
The answer, I think, is that a related, but profoundly different,
summary judgment burden of proof issue was expressly considered
at the time, and was expressly done so in connection with the 1939
132. An early American commentary surveyed summary judgment practice in the British
Empire, the United States, and portions of Canada. The commentary noted the requirement on a
moving party in a manner similar to the text here: "Judgment may be entered summarily for the
plaintiff.., on motion setting forth his demand and his belief that there is no defense to it, unless
the defendant, by counter-affidavit, shows that the facts are in dispute." Clark & Samenow, supra
note 86, at 423.
133. Dowling, supra note 13, at 497-98.
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expansion of the statute. A second line of cases, which began with
the 1942 Eagle Oil & Ref. Co. v. Prentice"3 opinion, addressed
the weight to be given to moving and defending parties' evidence.
As discussed below, the Eagle Oil-related rules, developed for
plaintiffs moving for summary judgment, did logically translate to
the subsequent, more general cases involving defendants moving
for summary judgment. But then, the courts confounded the two
types of burden, and, by 1958, finished by imposing both burdens
of proof and production on defendants moving for summary
judgment.
A. A Diversion on Burdens of Proof
California's Bernard E. Witldn, whose many and multi-volumed
works are relied on with as much assurance as the Supreme Court's
opinions, sets out the two types of burdens nicely:
The term "burden of proof' is often used loosely in two
senses: (a) The secondary meaning of the burden of initially
producing or going forward with the evidence. (b) The pri-
mary meaning of the burden of proving the issues of the
case.
The practical effect of the distinction is that (a) the bur-
den of going forward or initially producing evidence calls
the judge's powers into play, e.g., in ruling on a motion for
nonsuit, while (b) the burden of proof in the fundamental
sense operates when the case finally reaches the jury
[citations]. 35
The burden of going forward usually rests with the party who has
the burden of proof, 136 but not always. One party may bear the
134. 19 Cal. 2d 553, 122 P.2d 264 (1942).
135. 1 BEm RAD E. WmcrN, CALit F.NI EVIDENCE § 127, at 113-14 (3d ed. 1986).
136. CAL EVm. CODE §§ 500, 550 (West 1966).
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burden of going forward at first; that burden having been met, it
may be incumbent on the other party to then produce some evi-
dence to refute the first showing; and that, in turn, may require the
first party to produce further material, and so on, all without regard
to which party finally must convince the jury as a matter of the
burden of proof treated as the burden of persuasion, the primary
sense of the notion. 13
7
The critical issue, however, is alluded to in the latter section of
Witkin's quotation: Judges properly decide as a matter of law
whether a party has adequately produced some evidence, but only
triers of fact, such as juries, inquire whether a party has met the
burden of proof (qua burden of persuasion). Only triers of fact
decide whether a party has produced enough evidence.
In the context of a motion for summary judgment, the burden
of proof on parties has to do with the first type of burden, the
burden of production, on which judges are assigned decision-
making power.138 Plaintiffs who fail to come forward with evi-
dence on their claims will lose at trial in both state and federal
court, and will lose a summary judgment motion in federal
court. 139 Our peculiar problem is that they very well may suc-
cessfully defend a state summary judgment motion under California
law.
In the next Section, we will see that in an effort to allow juries
to adjudicate burdens of proof in "the fundamental sense" (proof
of issues), California judges abdicated their power to adjudicate
burdens in the "secondary" sense (initial production of evidence).
B. Eagle Oil: Ensuring Juries That Hear Conflicts of Evidence
Around the time of the 1939 statutory amendments, there was
express attention given not to the burden of production, the first
type of burden, but to the burden of persuasion, the second burden:
How much was enough evidence in the context of a summary judg-
137. See generally id. §115 (West 1966).
138. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330-31 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. See, e.g., Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1034-35 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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ment motion? Before 1939, when plaintiffs only made summary
judgment motions, defendants were held to a "liberal" standard.
They needed only to produce some evidence-and not much of that
evidence had to be "strictly admissible"-to survive summary judg-
ment.140 Such treatment was necessary to preserve the right to
trial by jury. The imposition of a more rigorous standard risked
keeping from the trier of fact a case that defendants might win.
That lenient treatment had been the rule in New York,141 whence
came California's rule. The Constitution's right to a jury trial also
required this same treatment. 142
A commentator, apparently the only one who looked forward
to the implementation of the 1939 amendments, one Edward A.
Mosk, considered whether this rule would apply when the then-new
1939 amendments became effective. 143 A "new problem" was
thus posed: What would happen when defendants moved for sum-
mary judgment after 1939? Mosk's Note cited some cases from
Wisconsin,' 44 a state which had allowed defendants to move for
summary judgment some years before California. In Wisconsin,
following the express commandment of the state statute, the courts
construed affidavits strictly against the moving party, and leniently
in favor of the defending party [plaintiff or defendant]. 45 This
Wisconsin rule prompted Mosk to predict that "it would seem that
140. Edward A. Mosk, Note, Procedure - Trial Practice - Summary Judgment - California
Code of Civil Procedure, Section 437c, 13 S. CAL. L. REv. 500, 523-25 (1940) (noting McComsey
v. Leaf, 99 Cal. App. 677, 97 P.2d 242 (1940)). The implicit notion of not "strictly" admissible
evidence may have some readers wondering: it seems a bit like being "slightly" pregnant. Pre-1939
cases suggest that hearsay, perhaps only once or twice removed (such as pleadings verified by
counsel) might qualify as evidence not "strictly" admissible. The reversed court of appeal in Celotex,
also thought that "evidence" not in admissible form, but perhaps "curable," might be enough to block
summary judgment. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 186 (D.C. Cit. 1985).
141. Looking to New York law, Eagle Oil noted that "[elven though the pleading itself be
deemed insufficient, the motion must be denied if the affidavits show facts sufficient to constitute
a defense entitling the pleader to defend. Curry v. Mackenzie, 239 N.Y. 267, 146 N.E. 375 (1925)."
Eagle Oil & Ref. Co. v. Prentice, 19 Cal. 2d 553, 560-61, 122 P.2d 264, 268 (1942).
142. Mosk, supra note 140, at 524, 525 (citing Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187
U.S. 315 (1902)).
143. Id.
144. Id at 525 n.16 (citing Fuller v. General Aee. Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 272 N.W. 839
(Wis. 1937)); Prime Mfg. Co. v. A.F. Gallun & Sons Corp., 281 N.W. 697 (Wis. 1938); Tregloan
v. Hayden, 282 N.W. 698 (Wis. 1938).
145. Wis. STAT. § 270.635 (1937).
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•.. the California courts will reach the same logical conclusion as
in Wisconsin."' 46
Mosk was right. In 1942, the Eagle Oil case decided just this
issue, relying on three specific sources for its rule: Mosk's com-
mentary, the case he was noting, McComsey v. Leaf,'47 and the
Wisconsin case he used, Fuller.148 The Eagle Oil court concluded
that "[ilt may further be said that the affidavits of the moving
party, the plaintiff in this case, should be strictly construed and
those of his opponent liberally construed." 149 Eagle Oil actually
arose under the older pre-1939 version of section 437c 150 but was
written three years after the statute had been amended. Thus, the
court was plainly aware that henceforth not only plaintiffs could
move for summary judgment, and, presumably, that is why it used
the inclusive phrase "moving party."
Eagle Oil is plainly right. Both defendants and plaintiffs have
jury rights, and, so long as a jury verdict is possible in one's favor,
summary judgment cannot be granted to the other. By 1949, the
rule had expressly been applied to defeat defendants' summary
judgment motion,' and it remains the law today.152
Over the next few years, a variety of cases involving defen-
dants' motions for summary judgment found their way to the
appellate courts. 53 But generally, the higher courts reversed
defendants' judgments because, as a result of admissible evidence
from both sides, the case ought to have been submitted to the jury.
For example, in Gale v. Wood, conflicting admissible affidavits on
the meaning of a written agreement required a trial, hence a rever-
sal of the summary judgment was granted to the defendants.'- 4
146. Mosk, supra note 138, at 525 (citing, inter alia, Fuller v. General Accident Fire & Life
Assurance Corp., 272 N.W. 893 (1937)).
147. McComsey v. Leaf, 99 Cal. App. 677, 97 P.2d 242 (1940).
148. Fuller General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 272 N.W. 839 (Wis. 1937).
149. Eagle Oil v. Prentice, 19 Cal. 2d 553, 556, 122 P.2d 264, 265 (1942) (emphasis added).
150. 1937 Cal. Stat. ch. 533, sec. 1, at 1545-46.
151. Haumeder v. Lipsett, 90 Cal. App. 2d 167, 176, 202 P.2d 819, 824 (1949) (relying on
Eagle Oil).
152. Pollak, supra note 2, at 423 nn.15-16.
153. See, e.g., Williams v. Reed, 113 Cal. App. 2d 195, 197, 248 P.2d 147, 149 (1952); Gale
v. Wood, 112 Cal. App. 2d 650, 651, 247 P.2d 67, 67-68 (1952).
154. Gale, 112 Cal. App. 2d at 657, 247 P.2d at 71.
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Such were routine implementations of Eagle Oil. However, not
every use of Eagle Oil was so routine.
C. Eagle Oil Jumps the Tracks
One of these cases following Eagle Oil, Williams v. Reed,5 '
cites a pivotal California Supreme Court case, Arnold v. Hibernia
Savings & Loan Society.16 Williams itself is innocuous; like
Gale, discussed above, admissible evidence on both sides had been
introduced, requiring trial on the merits and vacatur of the sum-
mary judgment."5 7 But it is the citation to Arnold which leads to
mischief and the unravelling of theretofore consistent and routine
precedent.
Arnold treated the claims of putative successors-in-interest as
"members" and "depositors" in a savings and loan institution. 158
The lower court had summarily dismissed the claims based on
uncontested evidence that no credit balances existed, and hence that
the plaintiffs had no claim as "depositors."'5 9 The supreme court
found a remaining issue on the plaintiffs' status as "members" of
the institution, however, and reversed.' 6
As the court noted, the trial judge had acted before section 437c
"was amended to authorize the dismissal of a complaint ....
But this did not stop the California Supreme Court from expressly
using the newly amended section 437c-and thus interpreting it for
posterity-to evaluate the propriety of the dismissal below. In so
doing, Arnold conflated two wholly distinct legal tests: (i) the
ancient doctrine governing the striking of sham pleadings with (ii)
new summary judgment dismissals. As discussed below, a defen-
dant's motion to strike a pleading (i.e. a complaint) as sham must
rely on evidence and is difficult to win. Arnold unthinkingly
155. 113 Cal. App. 2d 195, 248 P.2d 147 (1952).
156. 23 Cal. 2d 741, 146 P.2d 684 (1944).
157. Williams, 113 Cal. App. 2d at 206, 248 P.2d at 155.
158. Anold, 23 Cal. 2d at 743, 146 P.2d at 685.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 743-44, 146 P.2d at 685-86.
161. Jd at 744, 146 P.2d at 686.
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imported that standard into its analysis of the brand-new section
437c motion for summary judgment.' 62 Having noted that
plaintiffs had no proof of a key fact-the existence of a crucial
written assignment-the court wrote:
The theory of defendants apparently is that the trial court
... was at liberty to infer from the proof.., that plaintiffs
would be unable to substantiate [the allegations]. [However,
t]he rule is that before a court can strike a pleading as sham
or dismiss a complaint under section 437c it must clearly
appear that the allegations are false or that the action is
without merit, and every reasonable doubt must be resolved
in favor of the pleadings. (Continental [Bldg. & Loan]
Assn. v. Boggess, 145 Cal. 30, 34, [78 P. 245, 247 (1904)],
Eagle Oil & Ref. Co. v. Prentice, 19 Cal. 2d 553, 556, [122
P.2d 264, 265 (1942) (remaining citations ommitted)].16
In other words, while it was apparently true that the plaintiffs
would be unable to substantiate the allegations, the supreme court
ruled it irrelevant to the motion at hand. This is clumsy reasoning.
The only two cases cited by Arnold, Continental64 and Eagle
Oil,'65 do not concern the effect on a summary judgment motion
where the plaintiffs have no evidence. However, in subsequent
cases, Arnold was cited in the same breath as Eagle Oil for the
general standards applicable to section 437c summary judgment
motions.'6 Comparing Arnold with its two cited precedents,
Continental and Eagle Oil, is worth a detailed review.
162. " he rule is that before a court can strike a pleading as sham or dismiss a complaint tnder
section 437c it must clearly appear that the allegations are false or that the action is without merit
I..." L (emphasis added).
163. Il at 744-45, 248 P.2d at 686.
164. Continental Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Boggess, 145 Cal. 30, 34, 78 P. 245, 247 (1904).
165. Eagle Oil & Ref. Co. v. Prentice, 19 Cal. 2d 553, 556, 122 P.2d 264, 265 (1942).
166. See, e.g., Pianka v. State of California, 46 Cal. 2d 208, 212, 293 P.2d 458, 461 (1956);
Hetzler v. Hahling, 111 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 969, 970, 245 P.2d 377, 378 (1952); Dorsey v. City of
Los Angeles, 132 Cal. App. 2d 716,719, 282 P.2d 997, 999 (1955). Significantly, among other cases
Southern Pacific itself relies on and couples Arnold with Eagle Oil. See supra note 50 and
accompanying text (discussing Southern Pacific).
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1. Ancient Antecedent: The Motion to Strike Sham Pleadings
Continental recites a very high standard for striking pleadings.
Under that case, the pleadings must be "unquestionably false and
not pled in good faith" to allow a plaintiff to win.167 Such
motions were rarely granted. If the opposing party could suggest
the existence of any evidence at all to support his case, the court
could not strike his pleadings (whether they were an answer or
complaint), and would allow the case to proceed. 16 More to the
point, such motions to strike required an affirmative showing of a
vexatious litigant, with the substantial burden of proof resting on
the moving party.'69
At the time Arnold was decided, the Continental-type motion
to strike pleadings as sham 7' was the only method defendants
had to "go behind the pleadings" and have complaints dismissed on
grounds other than defects appearing on the face of the pleading.
These Continental motions were so-called "speaking" motions, that
is, motions which depended on matters of fact not apparent on the
pleadings or by way of judicial notice.' They were generally
167. Continental, 145 Cal. at 34, 78 P. at 247.
168. See generally CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 380
n.162 (1928); Rhea v. Hackney, 157 So. 190 (Fla. 1934); Doppelt v. Raeden, 192 N.Y.S. 835, 836
(1922).
169. Citing classic tomes on pleadings and purporting to apply the generally accepted test, the
Florida Supreme Court required proof of sham-"falsity in fact"--to be "indisputable," in addition
to a showing that the pleading was "interposed principally for delay or other unworthy motive!' and
(perhaps emphasizing the first requirement of "falsity") that there was no reasonable expectation that
the allegations could ever be sustained. Rhea, 157 So. at 194. The strict standard is quite old.
Eighteenth century English practice required affirmative proof that the pleading was not only untrue
but also vexatious and calculated to create unnecessary delay and expense. 1 JOSEPH CHrIrT, A
TREATISE ON THE PARTIES TO AcTIoNS, AND PLEADING 574 & n.(e) (7th Am. ed. 1837). Today the
test is not far different. Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 61
U.S.L.W. 4450 (U.S. May 3. 1993) (No. 91-1043) (providing that in the context of immunity for
antitrust purposes, sham pleading is one which (i) no reasonable litigant could realistically expect to
succeed, and (ii) is a function of subjective motive to abuse the process for ulterior, malicious ends).
170. "A pleading which is good in form but false in fact is sham. It differs from a 'frivolous'
pleading, which on its face presents no claim or defense." CLARK, supra note 168, at 380 n.162, 386.
Accord Rhea v. Hackney, 157 So. 190, 194 (Fla. 1934). See generally Doppelt v. Raeden, 192 N.Y.S.
835, 836 (1922).
171. Continental, 145 Cal. at 34, 78 P. at 247. See generally CLARK, supra note 168, at 554
n.194; Rhea, 157 So. at 194; Doppelt, 192 N.Y.S. at 836.
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known as "speaking demurrers. 172 These motions were "con-
demned, both by the common law and the Code system of
pleading." '73 Such speaking motions were allowed in California
in 1939 and, as such, involved the production of affidavits, that is,
evidence de hors the pleadings. Evidence of vexatious, bad faith
litigation so proved by defendants would result in the complaint's
dismissal unless controverted by the plaintiff's evidence. 74
Thus, these venerable speaking motions appeared to behave
very much like the defendants' summary judgment motions, which
had just been legitimized by the 1939 amendments to section 437c:
both types went behind the pleading, both were based on affidavits,
and both tested whether the case ought to have been before the
courts in the sense of having supporting evidence. In this light,
Arnold's equating the two types of motions is understandable, and
indeed other authorities saw as natural the transition from (i) the
motion to strike a pleading as sham to (ii) the new summary judg-
ment motion procedures.1 75 But, as a consequence of the con-
flation of these two types of motions, defendants in section 437c
motions bore the stringent and affirmative burden of showing plain-
tiffs' cases to be "clearly ... false." 176
In Arnold, the plaintiffs apparently could not produce a key
piece of evidence, a written assignment, which carried or lost the
172. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTroNAPY 1397 (6th ed. 1990).
173. Ellis v. Perley, 157 S.E. 29, 30 (1931). Such a motion was castigated as one "which from
the earliest days has been held to be bad." Steel v. Levy, 127 A. 766, 767 (1925). See also JOHN
ADAMS, THE DOCTRINE OF EQurry 335-36 & n.4 (8th ed. 1890); 1 EDMuND ROBERT DANNMILL,
PLEADING AND PRACTICE OF TmE HIGH COURT Op CHANCERY 588 & n.7 (6th Am. ed. 1894). See
also Teeter v. Veich, 57 A. 160 (1904); Ivins v. Jacob, 60 A. 1125 (1905); Foss v. People's Gas
Light & Coke Co., 89 N.E. 351 (1909); Ferris v. Union Sav. Bank, 165 S.E. 450 (1932); Preston A.
Blair Co. v. Rose, 51 P.2d 209, 212 (1935); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Perrin, 183 So. 917, 920 (1938);
Town of Randolph v. Lyon, 175 A. 1, 2 (1934); Whaley v. First Nat'l Bank of Opp, 155 So. 574,
575 (1934).
174. Cunha v. Anglo California Nat'l Bank, 34 Cal. App. 2d 383,390-91,93 P.2d 572,575-77
(1939); Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co., 44 Cal. 2d 321, 324-25, 282 P.2d 33, 35-36 (1955)
(citing Cunla). See generally supra note 169 (citing Chitty on Pleading and Rhea).
175. Clark, supra note 168, at 554. See generally Clark & Samenow, supra note 86, at 444
(commenting on early New York practice). Ironically, an early California summaryjudgment decision
expressly and properly rejected the attempt to conflate summary judgment procedures with motions
to strike sham pleadings. Cowan Oil & Ref. Co. v. Miley, 112 Cal. App. Supp. 773,778,295 P. 504,
506 (1931).
176. Arnold v. Hibernia Say. & Loan Soc'y, 23 Cal. 2d 741,744, 146 P.2d 684, 686 (1944).
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day. The inference was, therefore, that the plaintiffs would be
unable to substantiate their allegations at trial.'" Of course
defense counsel were not capable of meeting the Continental test
bearing on unquestioned falsity and bad faith. Thus, despite the
plaintiffs' plain failure of proof, the defendants lost their
motion. 7 '
Arnold ends with a long quotation from Eagle Oil to the effect
that summary judgment is a "drastic" remedy and affidavits filed
by defendants should be construed liberally to preserve rights to
jury trials.'" Arnold refers to Eagle Oil as direct precedent, and,
as a result of confusion with the very strict standard of Continental,
assumes that Eagle Oil bars the issuance of summary judgment in
defendants' favor even where plaintiffs cannot produce key evi-
dence. 80 In fact, Eagle Oil says nothing of the sort (it bars sum-
mary judgment for the plaintiff when the plaintiff fails to prove his
case). Only the Continental decision suggests such an analysis, but
with reference to a wholly different type of motion.'
In the same year that Arnold was decided, the California Court
of Appeal decided Gibson v. De La Salle Institute.182 Just as the
court in Arnold had assumed that the defendants had to disprove
the plaintiff's case, so too the parties in Gibson conceded the same
177. l
178. Id at 744-45, 146 P.2d at 686.
179. The court explained:
The issue to be determined by the trial court in consideration of a motion thereunder is
whether or not defendant has presented any facts which give rise to a triable issue or
defense, and not to pass upon or determine the issue itself, that is, the true facts in the
case ... . If that were not true, controversial issues of fact would be tried upon affidavits
by the court and not a jury. Because the procedure is summary and presented on affidavits
without the benefits of cross-examination, a trial by jury and opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses in giving their testimony, the affidavits filed on behalf of the
defendant should be liberally construed to the end that he will not be summarily deprived
of the full hearing available at a trial of the action and the rights incident thereto. The
procedure is drastic and should be used with caution in order that it may not become a
substitute for existing methods in the determination of issues of fact.
IL at 745, 146 P.2d at 686 (citing Eagle Oil, 19 Cal. 2d at 555-56, 122 P.2d at 264).
180. In the year before Arnold, the same court issued dicta suggesting that any moving party
bore the burden of producing evidence; this may have assisted the conflation I have noted in Arnold.
Hardy v. Hardy, 23 Cal. 2d 244, 143 P.2d 701 (1943).
181. See supra notes 164-167 and accompanying text (discussing the Continental decision).
182. 66 Cal. App. 2d 609, 152 P.2d 774 (1944).
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presumption. 83 That concession saved the court from having to
decide the matter. After a full and fair explanation of Eagle
Oil,"' the court immediately segued, as night follows day and as
if Eagle Oil led inexorably to the necessity for it, into the recitation
of the defendant's concession that the defendant would not be
entitled to summary judgment unless his affidavits contain suffi-
cient "facts" to win. 85 Gibson then reversed a summary judgment
previously entered in the defendants' favor.
86
2. The Impact on Eagle Oil
These transitional cases, Gibson and Arnold, did not confront
the basic question of whether Eagle Oil actually requires a moving
party defendant to affirmatively muster the facts sufficient for judg-
ment. Only a combination of obiter dicta, parties' concessions, and
hasty segues combined to establish Eagle Oil as precedent for the
proposition that defendants must disprove plaintiffs' case in a sum-
mary judgment context. No California court explicitly allocated
such a burden to defendants. By 1958, however, the defendants'
requirement to come forward with disproving evidence was
enshrined as gospel by the Southern Pacific decision.'87 True,
Eagle Oil was good precedent for rules of liberal construction of
affidavits, but not for all the substantive propositions on burden
allocation for which it was ultimately cited.
The segue from Eagle Oil to the latter rule on burden is well
illustrated in a case handed down over twenty years after Eagle
Oil. In Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., the supreme
183. Id. at 618, 152 P.2d at 779-80.
184. Id at 617-18, 152 P.2d at 779-80.
185. "It is conceded by respondent [defendant] in its brief that a motion for a summary
judgment may not be granted except on affidavits in favor of the moving party [here, the defendant]
containing facts sufficient to entitle him to judgment in his favor." Id. at 618, 152 P.2d at 780.
186. Id at 629, 632, 152 P.2d at 785, 787. Defendants' concession in Gibson never mattered.
Both plaintiffs and defendants submitted comprehensive affidavits establishing their interpretation of
a contract. The case was finally decided (over dissent) against defendants and remanded on the basis
that plaintiffs had established a factual dispute. The ruling had nothing to do with the necessity vel
non for defendants to affirmatively disprove plaintiffs' case.
187. Southern Pacific Co. v. Fish, 166 Cal. App. 2d 353, 366, 333 P.2d 133, 141 (1958).
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court reversed a summary judgment entered on behalf of defen-
dants accused of libel and slander:
In examining the sufficiency of affidavits filed in con-
nection with the motion, the affidavits of the moving party
are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally
construed, and doubts as to the propriety of granting the
motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing
the motion. Such summary procedure is drastic and should
be used with caution so that it does not become a substitute
for the open trial method of determining facts. [Citations to
Eagle Oil, Snider, and section 437c.] Thus, the trial court
was justified in granting the motion here only if the decla-
rations filed in support of it, strictly construed, contain facts
sufficient to entitle the [moving party] defendants to judg-
ment, and those of the plaintiffs, liberally construed, show
that there was no issue of fact to be tried. 8 '
The opinion is of Justice Mosk, the younger brother of commen-
tator Edward A. Mosk who wrote his considered commentary a
quarter of a century earlier. Up to the word "Thus," Justice Mosk
faithfully repeats the Eagle Oil doctrine and carries out his older
brother's 1940 prediction on the direction of California law.189
But thereafter, as if it were but part of a single principle and
logically compelled by the liberal construction rule of Eagle Oil,
Justice Mosk appears to impose on the defendants the burden of
coming forward with evidence sufficient to secure judgment in
their favor: Judgment for the defendants is proper only if their
declarations "contain facts sufficient to entitle" them to judgment.
188. Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 62 Cal. 2d 412, 417, 42 Cal. Rptr. 449, 452,
398 P.2d 785, 788 (1965).
189. See supra notes 142-144 and accompanying text (discussing Edward A. Mosk's
prediction).
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Justice Mosk makes a jump that his brother did not consider and
certainly did not endorse."9
But it seems a short distance, a narrow jump, from liberally
construing plaintiffs' declarations--declarations which after all
need not wholly contain admissible evidence 191-to pretermitting
the need for evidence altogether. An exaggeratedly "liberal" evalu-
ation of affidavits, exaggerated beyond logic, would permit the affi-
davits not to be filed at all by the nonmoving party.
A narrow jump, yet that short distance is of the essence. Eagle
Oil, for example, was decided to ensure that cases with factual dis-
putes got before a jury. 92 The modem doctrine exemplified by
Do it Urself and Barnes guarantees that cases without factual dis-
putes will be sent to the bewildered jury, there only to have the
judge direct the verdict. Eagle Oil ultimately rests on the constitu-
tional requirement that only juries, not judges,93 may decide the
burden of proof qua burden of persuasion,' but modem doctrine
conflates this with the other sense of "burden of proof' and bars
judges from pre-trial action on a party's failure to produce any evi-
dence necessary for success at trial.
The narrow jump from having some evidence to none is often
the distance between winning and losing the case: thus, it is not a
little thing. It is a difference that is clear to those who have seen
190. As the pre-1965 cases cited in this Article make clear-especially Southern
Pacific-Justice Mosk is not inventing law here, but simply repeating what had by then become holy
writ. The plaintiffs in Stationers actually conceded that they had no evidence of malice, an essential
element of their claim. Stationers, 62 Cal. 2d at 419, 421, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 454-55, 398 P.2d at 790-
91. The Court was swayed when it learned that the defendants had declined to assist the plaintiffs'
efforts to secure the key evidence, which was peculiarly in the province of the defendants (although
it appears that no court had ordered the defendants to comply with the plaintiffs' request). Id at 421,
42 Cal. Rptr. at 455, 398 P.2d at 791. By contrast, in a case decided with Celotex, the United States
Supreme Court, 20 years later, held that evidence of malice, even if generally in the hands of
defendants, must be produced by plaintiffs to avoid summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Significantly, Anderson endorsed the classic Eagle Oil standards
(though not by that name) of liberal construction of the papers defending against summary judgment.
Il at 255.
191. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing the Edward A. Mosk Note and
Catrett v. Johns Manville).
192. Eagle Oil & Ref. Co. v. B.H. Prentice, 19 Cal. 2d 553,555-56, 122 P.2d 264,265 (1942).
193. Of course when a jury is waived and the matter tried to the court, the judge sits as a trier
of fact and decides if she is persuaded by the evidence.
194. Eagle Oil, 19 Cal. 2d at 555-56, 122 P.2d at 265.
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California's summary judgment rule in all its glory. Superior Court
Judge Stuart Pollak has no quarrel with the Eagle Oil doctrine,
faithfully noting the requirement that opposing affidavits be
liberally construed so as to ensure access to juries for those who
have the evidence to present.195 But Judge Pollak emphatically
urges the destruction of the rule enforced in ie. Do It Urself,
Barnes, and Chevron.
D. A Legislative Riposte
Difficulties with California's summary judgment procedures
have encouraged some legislative activity I9 and various
legislative proposals from the Bar.1 97 Since the 1992 Chevron
decision, one proposal has become law. A version of A.B. 2616
was enacted into law as an amendment to section 437c, adding a
new subsection (n), which alludes to the burden of proof on
summary judgment. 98
But the statute remains opaque. It still places the burden of
showing that a cause of action has "no merit" on the defendant
moving for summary judgment. 99 Once that is done, the burden
would shift to the plaintiff to show that "triable issue" exists. While
many interpretations of the new language are conceivable, it
195. Pollak, supra note 2, at 423. See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
196. See, e.g., A.B. 2616, introduced February 11, 1992, as amended; A.B. 498, as amended
March 30, 1993 (imposing new standards of appellate review, and requiring party opposing motion
to set for facts showing a triable issue); A.B. 2010, as amended July 9, 1992 (would have imposed
joint "meet and confer" requirement on counsel prior to filing motions); S.B. 1409. As the text notes,
a version of A.B. 2616 was enacted into law, but these other efforts were not enacted.
197. The State Bar Standing Committee for the Administration of Justice has proposed new
language harmonizing state and federal law. Committee Agenda Item 92-11, on file with the State
Bar. The San Diego County Bar Association has sought State Bar approval to push for amendments
which would allow a court to summarily adjudicate (i) the effect of any writing and (ii) liability even
when the amount of damages is uncertain. ITEMS PROPOSED, STATE BAR CONFERENCE OF DELEGATES
(1993).
198. See CAL. CIrV. PROC. CODE § 437c (West Supp. 1993).
199. Section 437c(n)(2), in pertinent part, provides: "A defendant... has met his or her burden
of showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has shown that one or more elements of
the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense... Once the
defendant... has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff... to show that a triable issue
... exists ... :' Id. § 437c(n)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
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probably will have the effect of continuing the imposition on
moving defendants to demonstrate a negative, that there is no evi-
dence of an essential element. The second tier of the
test-imposing on plaintiffs the burden of showing a "triable
issue"--is not clear: Presumably, plaintiffs would then show that
they did have evidence, which would suggest that defendants could
not possibly have met their burden in the first place.2" That, of
course, suggests an internal contradiction in the new statutory
wording, which is likely to be resolved by courts continuing to
decide cases as they have. While the new amendment appears to
recognize the problem discussed in this Article, it does not solve
the problem.
IV. CONCLUSION
"History is a set of lies agreed upon."
Napoleon Bonaparte
Summary judgment was derived from a mid-Nineteenth century
British procedure outside the common law.2"' Upon introduction
in the United States, the procedure soon ran into constitutional
challenges.20 2 The 1937 Wisconsin decision in Fuller called it a
"harsh remedy,'' 2 3 and modem California courts have repeated
a tattered caution against the "drastic" procedure. 2' As this
Article has shown, that caution derives from the application of the
original rule, one which would grant plaintiffs relief without a trial.
In those circumstances, the cases unanimously and properly
required a plaintiff to assume the same burden at summary judg-
ment as he would have at trial.
200. Id. § 437c(n).
201. Bills of Exchange Act, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 67 (1855). See generally Clark & Samenow,
supra note 85.
202. See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 317 (1902).
203. Fuller, 272 N.W. at 843.
204. See, e.g., Hoosier v. Randa, _ Cal. App. 4th _, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 520 (1993);
Hepp v. Lockheed-California Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 714,717, 150 Cal. Rptr. 408,410 (1978); Miles
Lab., Inc. v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d 587, 593, 184 Cal. Rptr. 98, 102 (1982).
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In 1939, the legislature allowed defendants to seek summary
judgment as well. The momentum of opinion created while plain-
tiffs only might seek summary judgment motions carried over past
the 1939 change which authorized defendants' motion. Under Eagle
Oil, both moving plaintiffs and defendants were burdened, prop-
erly, with having their papers strictly construed, and those of
opposing parties interpreted with great generosity. The courts
imported another burden on moving parties: the burden of estab-
lishing each element necessary to sustain the judgment. This burden
made sense for moving plaintiffs, but not for moving defendants.
Looking back for the authority for the latter burden on moving
defendants, one finds only cases imposing it on plaintiffs. In the
mid-1940's, there are a few cases in which defendants' burden to
prove the case (i.e. to disprove the plaintiff's claims) is assumed.
That onus was falsely equated with the Eagle Oil burden, perhaps
as the result of the Arnold case, which just says it is so, conflating
motions for summary judgment with motions to strike sham plead-
ings. Or perhaps the burden to disprove plaintiffs' case was the
result of the thinking in Hardy, which invokes the statute. But
Eagle Oil does not decide what Arnold says, and the statute does
not specify the burden.
By 1958, the two burdens had merged and defendants moving
for summary judgment were required to produce proof negating
plaintiffs' case in chief. Contrary to the original rule, now parties
at motion hearings need to assume a burden they do not have at
trial: the burden of disproving an unsupported case.
Those pining for a change in California's summary judgment
law have suggested amendments to the statute. °5 But problems
in the law heretofore are the byproduct of judges, not legislators;
205. Even Judge Stuart Pollak, who so persuasively decries current California law, believes that
a statutory amendment is needed to fix the problem. Pollak, supra note 2, at 429. While Judge Pollak
is wrong in his apparent assumption that the burden of proof problem inheres in the statute, he may
be right from a practical point of view: The sort of blind adherence to bad law found in appellate
opinions such as Chevron suggests turning one's attention to another branch of government. See
supra notes 194-197 and accompanying text. Judge Pollak himself later declined-with reluctance,
we might assume-to endorse the federal rule announced in Celotex, and was roundly complimented
by his superiors for his forbearance. Biljac Associates v. First Interstate Bank, 218 Cal. App. 3d
1410, 1422, 1443-44, 267 Cal. Rptr. 819, 825 (1990).
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and judges have the power to change the law. Cases such as
Chevron are wrong to hold the legislature wholly responsible by
the suggestion that the allocation of the burden of proof is statu-
torily mandated.
Confounded by circular string cites, rough logic, and ancient
conflated doctrines on the burden of proof, the patient reader may
think that California courts would never, never grant a defendant's
summary judgment motion.
That is not quite true. In a case even more recent than Chevron,
the court of appeal treated a student's claim that his rights were
violated when he was "detained" for psychiatric examination. On
receipt of a failing grade in income taxation, the student had told
his professor, "You are a dead man," followed by placing a chicken
carcass with a knife through it outside the professor's door.2 6
The appellate court actually approved the trial court's grant of
summary judgment.2 7
206. Taback v. Regents of the University of California, (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (unpublished
opinion on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
207. "Appellant contends (I) he should have gotten higher grades in his classes at the
University of California-Berkeley, and his rights were violated when he received grades such as a
B rather than an A in physical education, and a B-plus rather than an A-minus in English; and (2)
he should not have been detained for psychiatric observation in the fall of 1982, when he began to
engage in irrational, delusional and threatening behavior--such as telling a professor who gave
appellant a failing grade in income taxation, 'You are a dead man,' followed by placing a chicken
carcass with a knife through it outside the professor's door. The trial court granted summary
judgment. We affirm the trial court's ruling." Slip op. at 1.
1886
